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Evolutionary game dynamics describes not only frequency dependent genetical evolution, but also
cultural evolution in humans. In this context, successful strategies spread by imitation. It has been
shown that the details of strategy update rules can have a crucial impact on evolutionary dynamics in
theoretical models and e.g. significantly alter the level of cooperation in social dilemmas. But what
kind of strategy update rules can describe imitation dynamics in humans? Here, we present a way to
measure such strategy update rules in a behavioral experiment. We use a setting in which individuals are
virtually arranged on a spatial lattice. This produces a large number of different strategic situations from
which we can assess strategy updating. Most importantly, spontaneous strategy changes corresponding
to mutations or exploration behavior are more frequent than assumed in many models. Our experimental
approach to measure properties of the update mechanisms used in theoretical models will be useful for
mathematical models of cultural evolution.
Classical game theory assumes that agents make rational
decisions, taking into account that they are interdependent
with other agents that are also fully rational [1]. While this
assumption has proven to be problematic even in humans,
evolutionary game theory has been developed to describe
the dynamics of genetical or cultural evolution when fitness
is not fixed, but depends on the interactions with others.
Applications of this framework range from the dynamics of
microbes [2–4] to animal behavior [5, 6] and human be-
havior [7–9]. Many aspects of evolutionary dynamics hinge
upon the microscopic rules describing how successful strate-
gies spread. In particular in structured populations, these
rules can crucially alter the evolutionary outcome and, for
example, determine whether cooperation evolves or not [10–
12]. Thus, it is of great importance to infer how strategies
are actually adopted. To this end, we have developed a be-
havioral experiment that mimics typical properties of the-
oretical models, but replaces the computer agents by real
human players. Each player interacts only with her imme-
diate neighbors. To evaluate his performance, each player
can compare his payoff to the payoff of the neighbors and
use this as a basis to adopt new strategies. However, there
are some subtle differences between mathematical models
and human behavior: Humans may use mixed strategies,
i.e. randomize between their options, or even change their
strategies over time, whereas most theoretical models con-
sider the simplest case in which a player’s strategy is equated
with his action. Thus, any change in behavior is equated
to a change in the strategy. If we aim to apply this sim-
ple framework of one-shot games as a first approximation
to describe human behavior, we have to infer the details
of strategy adoption, e.g. the rate of spontaneous strategy
changes. We utilize a spatial game in which human players
are interacting with their immediate neighbors only. This
leads to a large number of different strategic situations that
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allows us to infer under which circumstances a neighboring
strategy is adopted.
A large portion of the literature on evolutionary games
focuses on the Prisoner’s Dilemma. This is a paradigm
to study the evolution of costly cooperation among selfish
individuals, because it highlights the potential differences
between individual interests and the social optimum [13–
17]. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, two players have to de-
cide simultaneously whether to cooperate with the other or
not. If both players cooperate, they obtain a reward R. If
one defects while the other cooperates, the defector gets T
(temptation to defect) and the cooperator obtains S (suck-
ers payoff). If both defect, they get a punishment P . This
can be summarized by the payoff matrix
(C D
C R S
D T P
)
. (1)
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is characterized by the payoff rank-
ing T > R > P > S (and in addition 2R > T + S for
repeated games). In this case, rational individuals choose
defection: They are greedy and try to exploit other coopera-
tors (T > R), but they also fear that the other one will try to
exploit them (P > S). However, since mutual cooperation
yields a higher payoff than mutual defection (R > P ), play-
ers face a dilemma: Individual reasoning leads to defection,
but mutual cooperation implies a higher payoff. Similarly, in
an evolutionary setting the higher payoff of defectors implies
more reproductive success and thus cooperation should not
evolve. However, cooperation can evolve for example by kin
selection, spatial structure or when interactions are repeated
[18]. There is a large body of literature on behavioral ex-
periments based on the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, see
e.g. [19, 20]. It is clear the humans behave in a more so-
phisticated way than simple computer programs [19], but
it has also been shown that working memory constraints
limit human behavior in repeated games [21]. Nonetheless,
with few exceptions, see e.g. [22], theorists have focused
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2on simple forms of strategy choice, e.g. to disentangle the
effects of population structure and game characteristics. In
particular, the spatial version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma has
been analyzed in great detail by theorists [23–27]. Initially,
research has focused on simple lattices that approximate
interactions in spatially homogeneous systems. More re-
cently, many studies have addressed complex social net-
works instead [28, 29]. Typically, players are arranged on a
social network and interact pairwise only with their immedi-
ate neighbors, choosing either cooperation or defection for
all interactions. In each round, the payoff of every player is
accumulated in pairwise encounters with all its neighbors.
Individuals with high payoffs are either imitated more often
than others (in social models) or produce more offspring (in
genetic models). The dynamics in spatially structured pop-
ulations depend crucially on the details of the microscopic
rules by which the players update their strategies. Our goal
is to shed some light onto these microscopic rules that de-
scribe how players change their strategies.
Such a behavioral experiment with humans can only be
done in comparably small systems due to some restrictions
in experimental games that are absent in mathematical
models. For example, participants have to be paid in real
money and their anonymity must be guaranteed such that
the results are not blurred by potential reputation effects.
Throughout this study, we focus on R = 0.30 e , S = 0.00
e , T = 0.40 e , and P = 0.10 e . This leads to the
2× 2 payoff matrix
( C D
C 0.30 e 0.00 e
D 0.40 e 0.10 e
)
. (2)
Players were virtually arranged on spatial 4× 4 lattice with
periodic boundary conditions, which corresponds to the sur-
face of a torus. The participants had four fixed neighbors
throughout the entire game. Thus, the possible cooperator
payoffs accumulated in their four interactions are 0.00 e ,
0.30 e , 0.60 e , 0.90 e , and 1.20 e . A defector has the
possible payoff values 0.40 e , 0.70 e , 1.00 e , 1.30 e , and
1.60 e .
Many theoretical studies are based on synchronous updat-
ing, which means that all players make strategy revisions at
the same time. This can easily be mimicked in behavioral
experiments. However, the way that strategies are changed
is more difficult to address. A typical assumption is that
each player chooses the strategy that obtains the highest
payoff in the neighborhood, either his previous strategy or
a different one. In our experiment, players have many dif-
ferent possibilities for strategy updating. It is clear that
human players sometimes do not follow this “imitate the
best“ rule, but choose their strategies in a different fash-
ion. Nonetheless, this imitation dynamics can serve as a
first approximation for strategy updating.
More recent studies have stressed that strategy adoption
is stochastic, which can be modeled introducing an intensity
of selection [30, 31]. One possibility is the following imita-
tion process with errors: Each player compares his payoff
to the best performing neighbor that has played a differ-
ent strategy and calculates the payoff difference ∆pi. With
probability p = (1 + exp[−β∆pi])−1, he adopts the neigh-
bors strategy [32–34]. Here, β measures the intensity of
selection, i.e. how important the payoffs are for strategy
revisions. In our case with two strategies only, this is equiv-
alent to the multinomial logit model [35, 36]. Our goal is
to understand which strategy adaption rules can describe
human behavior in this game.
I. RESULTS
Let us first address if imitation dynamics can describe
human strategy updating. In total, we have 5760 individ-
ual decisions to keep a strategy or to switch it. As a first
model, we assume that all individuals use the imitate the
best rule, i.e. they always imitate the best performing neigh-
bor strategy, including their own. It has been shown that
this cannot fully describe human behavior [37]. Fig. 1 re-
veals that in our experiment, initially 62% of the individuals
follow the imitate the best rule. However, the remaining
38% of the strategy changes cannot be explained by pure
imitation. This fraction tends to decrease over time in the
experiment. Fitting an exponential function to the data
from Fig. 1 reveals that the fraction of strategy choices that
are not explained by imitation decreases roughly by 4% per
round. This reflects the fact that strategy choice changes
over time in our behavioral experiment and that a stationary
state is not reached.
In theoretical models of the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma,
one is typically interested in the average level of cooperation
of the system. The idea is that in a spatial setting, clusters
of cooperators can form, leading to a significant degree of
cooperation [11, 12, 23, 24]. To explore how the level of co-
operation is affected by spatial structure, we have also con-
ducted a control experiment in which the spatial structure
was broken up by reassigning each player’s neighbors each
round. Since in the spatial treatment individuals interact al-
ways with the same co-players and can form stable clusters
of cooperators, one would expect a higher level of cooper-
ation in the fixed-neighbors than in the random-neighbors
treatment. As described in previous human behavioral ex-
periments [38] (and not necessarily in line with the expecta-
tions of theoreticians), the average level of cooperation at
the start of the experiment is comparably large and very sim-
ilar in the treatment with fixed neighbors (70.0%, averaged
over 15 repeats) and the treatment with random neighbors
(70.6%, averaged over 10 repeats). Most interestingly, we
do not find a significant difference in the level of cooperation
during the course of the game between the two treatments,
see Fig. 2. Only in round 4, there is a significant differ-
ence between the levels of cooperation, which disappears
after Bonferroni correction for multiple comparison. Sta-
ble clusters of cooperators are not found in our behavioral
experiments. The high probability of spontaneous strategy
changes decreases the influence of spatial structure.
It turns out that the dynamics can be explained based on
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FIG. 1: Strategy updating in behavioral experiments with
fixed neighbors. Most strategy changes can be explained
by imitation of the most successful neighbor (full bars), i.e.
changing to the best available strategy in a heterogeneous en-
vironment where neighbors play different strategies (brown)
or sticking to the strategy when everyone does the same in
a homogeneous environment (orange). However, a large por-
tion of strategy changes cannot be explained by imitation
(open bars). These are either spontaneous strategy switching
in homogeneous environments with no role model (open or-
ange bars) or choosing a strategy that did not perform best
in an environment with different neighboring strategies (open
brown bars). The line shows a fit of the fraction of strat-
egy changes not explained by imitation. This fraction decays
approximately exponentially as ν0 · Γt−1. A nonlinear regres-
sion leads to ν0 = 0.380 ± 0.013 and Γ = 0.962 ± 0.003 (full
line). The diagrams on the right show an example for a het-
erogeneous (top) and a homogeneous environment (bottom)
of a focal cooperating player. In total, we have 4315 hetero-
geneous situations and 1445 homogeneous situations in our
5760 strategy choice situations (graphic shows averages over
15 fixed neighbor treatments with 25 rounds and 16 player
each).
the way that our subjects revise their strategies. The gen-
eral dynamics of the system can be captured by a simple
random strategy choice approach [39]. We assume that a
player can do two things when revising her strategy (i) with
probability ν, she chooses a random strategy, and (ii) with
probability 1 − ν, she imitates her best performing neigh-
bor. In our behavioral experiment, we find that ν decays
exponentially with the round t of the game as ν = ν0Γ
t−1.
Such an exponential decay of exploration rates has been
reported before [40]. Our experiment yields for the best
fit ν0 = 0.380 and Γ = 0.962. To test our assumption, we
simulated the temporal dynamics of 15 runs under imitation
dynamics with four neighbors, fitting the strategy choice pa-
rameters to the experiment. In order to be consistent with
random strategy choice, we assume that only a fraction of
1− 2ν is correct imitation. A fraction ν is random strategy
choice leading to the “correct” strategy that is consistent
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FIG. 2: The average level of cooperation tends to decrease
over time. Symbols show a behavioral experiment with hu-
mans and lines correspond to simulations. In the experi-
ment, the treatment with fixed neighbors on a 4 × 4 lattice
with periodic boundary conditions (squares) is not signifi-
cantly different from the dynamics in a system with random
neighbors (triangles). Full lines show computer simulation
in which players either imitate their best performing neigh-
bor or choose a random strategy with probability 2ν · Γt−1,
where ν = 0.38 and Γ = 0.96 (fitted to the behavioral experi-
ment, see text). For such high probability of random strategy
choice, the simulation results for fixed and random neighbors
are almost indistinguishable, the level of cooperation is driven
by random strategy choice rather than by spatial structure.
For comparison, dotted lines show computer simulations with
no mutations (experimental average over 15 repeats for fixed
neighbors and 10 repeats for random neighbors, each with 16
players; simulations starting from the cooperation level of the
experiment, averaged over 104 realizations).
with imitation and a fraction ν are strategy changes not
expected from imitation. Fig. 2 reveals that this approach
can capture the average cooperation level in the behavioral
experiment. Comparing 15 simulations with 15 experimen-
tal treatments reveals no significant difference between the
simulations and the experiments after Bonferroni correction
which takes into account multiple comparison. We can sum-
marize this approach by the following equation governing
strategy choice,
pA→B = ν0Γt−1 +
(
1− 2ν0Γt−1
)
Θ(piB − piA), (3)
where B is the best performing neighbor of A, t is the
round of the game, piA and piB are the payoffs of A and B,
respectively, and Θ(x) is the Heaviside function (Θ(x) = 0
for x ≤ 0 and Θ(x) = 1 for x > 0). In our experiment, we
find ν0 = 0.380± 0.013 and Γ = 0.962± 0.003, see Fig. 1.
Next, let us abstract from the fact that strategy adoption
changes over time and analyze the way in which individuals
imitate their co-players in more detail. First, we analyze all
situations in which players do the same as their four neigh-
4bors. How likely are they to switch strategies? It turns out
that cooperators switch to defection in such a homogeneous
environment with probability µC = 0.28 ± 0.07 (averaged
over 45 such situations). Defectors switch to cooperation
with probability µD = 0.25±0.01 (averaged over 1400 such
situations). These probabilities correspond to spontaneous
mutations or strategy exploration of the players. To analyze
imitation is less straightforward, because it is impossible to
say if people changed to a different strategy imitating a par-
ticular neighbor, several ones at the same time, at random
or based on some more sophisticated argumentation. For
example, human players who find themselves in a neighbor-
hood of cooperators may be tempted to defect, anticipating
to win the highest possible payoff, before another neighbor
defects. They may also expect others to take advantage
of a cooperative neighborhood sooner or later. However,
we can at least quantify the average behavior. We take all
decisions into account in which a focal cooperator had at
least one defecting neighbor (1524 decisions) or in which a
focal defector has a least one cooperating neighbor (2791
decisions). Some of these strategy changes will again corre-
spond to random strategy exploration, but we can assume
that this occurs with a probability that is independent of
the payoff difference.
Depending on the payoff difference to the neighbor who
performs best by using a different strategy than the focal
player, what is the probability that the focal player switches
to that other strategy? Fig. 3 shows that the probability
increases with the success of the neighbor, as expected. A
cooperator is typically confronted with defector performing
better, while a defector can typically only choose to imi-
tate a cooperator performing worse. Moreover, defectors
are more resilient to change than cooperators. To model
strategy changes, we assume that the probability to switch
strategy is given by p = (1 + exp [−β∆pi])−1. Note that for
β →∞, we recover the unconditional imitation from above.
Fitting this function to the data shown in Fig. 3 leads to
β = 1.20 ± 0.25. The error corresponds to the standard
deviation in a binomial distribution,
√
p(1− p)/n, where n
is the number of samples. If we want to take the difference
in strategy adoption of cooperating players and defecting
players into account, we can also fit two different functions
to the data, see Fig. 3 If we instead use the average payoff
difference to players using a different strategy, we obtain
β = 1.15 ± 0.23. Also in this case, defecting players seem
to be more resilient to change.
Fig. 3 also shows how the probability to cooperate de-
pends on the number of cooperating neighbors. This does
not take any payoffs into account and addresses wether
players imitate the common rather than the more success-
ful. It turns out that the probability to cooperate is below
50% even when all neighbors are cooperating. Thus, in our
experiment players do not only imitate the most common
strategy, but decide for cooperation or defection in more
complex ways.
The intensity of selection measured in our experiments
reveals that humans do not simply accept any strategy that
is performing better than their strategy, as assumed by imi-
tation dynamics. However, β is also so high that analytical
results obtained under weak selection may not always ap-
ply. Again, we can summarize our approach by a simple
equation. If neglect temporal dependence, but take the dif-
ferences between cooperators and defectors into account,
we find
pC→D = µC +
1− µC
1 + e−βC(piD−piC)+αC
(4)
pD→C = µD +
1− µD
1 + e−βD(piC−piD)+αD
. (5)
Our analysis leads to µC = 0.28± 0.07, βC = 0.67± 0.28
and αC = −0.11± 0.23 for cooperating players and µD =
0.25 ± 0.01, βD = 0.99 ± 0.23 and αD = 0.79 ± 0.14 for
defecting players.
II. DISCUSSION
As expected, players imitate others with probability in-
creasing with the payoff difference. In evolutionary game
dynamics, this corresponds to selection. But sometimes
players switch spontaneously to a new strategy at random,
which corresponds to a mutation. Our approach reveals
that the probability of such random changes is much higher
than typically assumed in theoretical models.
Theoreticians are often interested in the dynamics for very
large populations and not in finite size effects. However,
considering large population is unfeasible in behavioral ex-
periments, where many repeats are required. Moreover, our
predecessors lived in small social groups and our behav-
ior may have adapted to that situation. Regardless of the
complexity of our modern society, human interactions oc-
cur typically within small social groups even today. Most
importantly, the way players choose strategies based on lo-
cal information does not seem to be fundamentally different
in larger systems [41]. Decision making in humans is cer-
tainly a complicated process that goes far beyond the sim-
ple models that are typically considered. However, we argue
that important aspects of human behavior are not captured
by the different mechanisms of imitation. Modeling these
processes by random strategy choice can lead to very differ-
ent dynamics in theoretical models and captures the general
trend of the dynamics in our system, cf. Fig. 2.
In our experiment, we have analyzed the simplest system
in which humans play a spatial game. Many challenges lie
ahead: Theoretical models describe not only interactions on
regular lattices, but also heterogeneous networks [42], dy-
namical networks [43] or set structured populations [44]. It
would be fruitful to initiate a discussion in the scientific com-
munity how such more complex models can be approached
by behavioral experiments.
III. METHODS
From 2003-2004, voluntary human subjects for the ex-
periment were recruited from first semester biology courses
5at the Universities of Kiel, Cologne and Bonn. A total of
400 students participated in the experiment. The students
were divided into 25 groups consisting of 16 players each.
In the spatial treatment (15 groups) the 16 subjects were
virtually arranged on a spatial grid with periodic boundary
conditions. This torus shaped geometry ensures that there
are no edges in the system. Each subject had four fixed di-
rect neighbors throughout the experiment (von-Neumann
neighborhood). To ensure the players anonymity, each
player was identified by a letter ranging from a to p (e.g.
a has the following neighbors: b, d, e and m). The sub-
jects would exclusively interact with these four neighbors
and received no further information about the remaining 11
subjects. In the non-spatial control treatment (10 groups)
the 16 subjects where positioned on a new random position
on the lattice in each round, such that the probability that
another interaction with a particular co-player takes place
is 4/15. Otherwise the control experiment was conducted
exactly in the same way as in the spatial treatment. The
students were fully aware of whether they were in a fixed or
randomized neighborhood.
The subjects started in both treatments without money
on their account. Each group played a total of 25 pris-
oners dilemma rounds, allowing them to earn on average
between 10.00 e (for full defection) and 30.00 e (for full
cooperation). A single player, however, may theoretically
also obtain nothing (if the player always cooperates, but his
four partners always defect) or up to 40.00 e (if the player
always defects, but his partners always cooperate).
Each subject had a decision box on his/her private table
that was equipped with silent YES, NO and OK buttons.
During a short oral introduction the subjects received infor-
mation about the use of their decision box and how their
anonymity would be ensured throughout and after the ex-
periment. At the beginning of the experiment a written
instruction explaining the game (see Supporting Informa-
tion) was projected on a screen visible to all players. Each
subject had to confirm via the OK button that he/she had
finished reading and had understood each of the displayed
instruction pages.
In both treatments, each subject had to make a single
decision in each round either cooperate or defect in the
Prisoners Dilemma played with all four neighbors simulta-
neously. This setting corresponds to synchronous strategy
adjustment. After every round the subjects could observe
the results of the round on their personal display which could
display a maximum of 32 characters. Decisions were dis-
played in the following form:
s Y t Y u N v N w Y
6 1 2 7 1 0 6
.
The display has been explained in detail in three examples
and subjecs had no problems understanding it. Here, s, t,
u, v and w are the codes for the different players. Each
player is provided with his own strategy (cooperation, Y ,
or defection, N) and payoff as well as the chosen strategies
of the direct neighbors and their respective payoffs, which
resulted from their interactions with their 4 neighbors (e.g.
own payoff of s: 6 = 0.60 e ; payoff player t: 12 = 1.20
e ). The computer calculated the individual’s payoff from
all four encounters and transfered the cumulated payoff to
the player’s account after each round. At the end of the ex-
periment the players received the money on their respective
account in cash without losing their anonymity, see [45] for
details.
Throughout the experiment the complete anonymity of
the subjects was assured by the following measures: Sub-
jects were seated between separations, such that no visual
contact between them was possible. All boxes were con-
nected to a computer to record each individual decision.
The subjects were informed that they were not allowed
to talk or to contact each other during the experiment.
Each player could only be identified by his pseudonym (a-
p) both by other players as well as by the experimenters.
Pseudonyms could not be connected with the students’ real
identity.
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FIG. 3: Strategy updating in a spatial game. (a) As ex-
pected, the probabil0ity to switch to another strategy in-
creases with the payoff difference. Theoretical models typ-
ically assume strategy update functions such as e.g. p =
(1 + exp [−β∆pi])−1, where p is the probability to switch
strategy and ∆pi is the payoff difference. Fitting this function
leads to an intensity of selection β = 1.20 ± 0.25 (full line).
However, the data for cooperating and defecting players seem
to follow different characteristics and defecting players seem
to be more resilient to change than cooperators. To capture
this, we have also fitted the two different data sets to the func-
tion (1 + exp [−β∆pi + α])−1 (dotted lines). This approach
leads to βC = 0.67± 0.28 and αC = −0.11± 0.23 for cooper-
ating players. For defecting players, we find βD = 0.99± 0.23
and αD = 0.79 ± 0.14. The inset shows the probability
to change strategies spontaneously, without any role models
playing a different strategy. Such spontaneous changes cor-
respond to mutations and occur with probability 0.28 ± 0.07
(cooperating players switching to defection) or 0.25±0.01 (de-
fecting players switching to cooperation). This probability is
much higher in our experiment than typically assumed for
theoretical models, but decreases exponentially in time (see
Fig. 1). (b) Another perspective is to infer the probability to
cooperate in the next round, given the number of coopering
neighbors in the current round. This probability is highest if
all neighbors cooperate, although in this case the payoff from
defection would be highest. This indicates that humans do
not only imitate what is successful, but also what is common
(All error bars are the standard deviations of a binomial dis-
tribution,
√
p(1− p)/n, where n is the number of samples).
